
Party unity in the US Senate, 2009
Partisan differences and the 'public option'
What I found is that Americans, regardless of party identification, generally favor a mixture of both private and government health insurance. To be sure, Republicans are more favorable of private plans and Democrats more in favor of a government plan (with Independents somewhere in the middle), but there is surprisingly not a great deal of difference between the parties.
The first of the two graphs shows the mean value for members of each party, along with 'Independents' (N.B., 'leaners' were coded as partisans) on the seven-point ANES scale. What we see is a strong degree of consistency in attitude, especially among Democrats and Independents. Starting in the early 1990s Republicans became less favorable to the so-called 'public option', although this trend seems to have stopped to a large degree.
The second graph shows the differences in mean position for each of the three groups. For example, the red line shows the mean difference in opinion between Republicans and Democrats. Two things are immediately notable:
- The differences in the average position between Democrats and Republicans has grown larger over time and continues to do so. The average difference between Democrats and Republicans during the 1970s was roughly one point on the ANES scale. In the 30 years between 1978 and 2008 it doubled. Clearly the divide between partisans, not party elites, has increased and in today's partisan environment, will probably continue to increase. This divide might help explain the seemingly great animosity between sided on the health care reform issue.
- The difference between Democrats and Independents was much greater in 2008 than in 1992. Both Bill Clinton and Barack Obama campaigned on health care reform, and on some sort of government-provided health care ('socialized medicine', if you will) as important parts of the platform. For each it was the dominant focus of their freshman year legislative agenda. Yet Obama was successful while Clinton was not. Why? One answer might be that the Democrats have larger majorities now than they had in 1992. Another reason might be that Democrats are now much more ideologically similar than they were in 1992, largely caused by the 1994 Congressional election all but decimating the Democratic Southern Caucus.
Ohio Issue 3, 2009
- Central Ohio voters were more likely than not opposed to the issue. Voters in Delaware and Franklin counties voted against the measure by roughly a 3-2 margin. Those in surrounding counties such as Pickaway, Madison, and Licking also opposed the amendment, albeit by a narrower margin.
- Voters in and near cities in the Northeast and Southwest, i.e. Cleveland, Cincinnati, and environs, supported the measure.


Harkin says he has the votes
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/60739-public-option-fails-in-senate-committee
How low can Obama's approval rating get and he still win re-election?
Ideology and Supreme Court confirmation votes
100 day job grades

(for details on how this plot was created, see here.)
Gender and non-partisanship
Figure 1. Probability of non-partisanship among men and women, by age group, 2006.

Figure 2. Probability of non-partisanship among men and women, by age group, 2006.

Gallup partisanship trends, 2004-present

The pale dots reflect specific poll results, the wiggly solid lines represent LOWESS-smoothed trends, and the dotted lines represent linear trend estimates based on bivariate OLS regression.
Who votes for green parties?
Table 1. Summary data for placement on a left-right scale of green and social democratic voters.

Next I will look at some proxies for middle-class status and their relationship with a predilection for voting either green or social democratic. Since my hypothesis is not only that persons who are currently middle class are, ideology being held constant, more likely to vote green than social democratic, but also (and this is actually the important past), those who have middle-class backgrounds, i.e., their parents were middle class as well, form the base of ecological party support. Therefore, two proxies for continued middle-class status are introduced, father’s level of education and father’s employment status – professional, middle class, working class.
1. Level of education
First, looking at the respondent's (voter's) level of education, there is in several countries in the survey a marked relationship in the likelihood to support either a green or social democratic party, based on level of education. This relationship is particularly evident in the case of Austria:
Figure 1. The relationship between education and the probability of voting either green (Grüne) or social democratic (SPÖ) in Austria.

The above graph shows Austria to be an almost perfect illustration of the effect of education on voting behavior among "soft left" respondents. the probability lines are almost symmetrical in their negative relationship - the less educated you are, the more likely you will vote for the SPÖ; the better educated, the greater likelihood you will vote Grüne, with the point at which the likelihood is the same being at roughly 15 years of education.
Figure 2. The relationship between education and the probability of voting either green (Vihreä liitto) or social democratic (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue) in Finland.

Here we see a situation similar to the one in Austria, where "soft-left" voters likelihood to vote green can be seen as a function of education more than anything else, especially as we see education level as a proxy for social class (probably something we can get away with more readily in Europe than in the United States.)
Figure 3. The relationship between education and the probability of voting either green (Grüne) or social democratic (SPÖ) in Sweden.

Class "voting" in Ohio

The pattern seems clear.
'Spreading the wealth'
The graph below shows the average response to the General Social Surveys question, "SHOULD GOVT REDUCE INCOME DIFFERENCES?"

Are these attitudes dependent on external conditions, like high unemployment? In most cases, no. In particular, neither Democrats nor Republicans seem swayed in their beliefs by external conditions. In one case, however, there is evidence of economic conditions affecting attitudes towards redistributive policies. Independents, it seems, respond to economic growth through increased opposition (or decreased support, if you will) for redistributive policies.

Maybe parties don't matter?
Considering America’s Depression-era politics in comparative perspective reinforces the impression that there may have been a good deal less real policy content to “throwing the bums out” than meets the eye. In the U.S., voters replaced Republicans with Democrats and the economy improved. In Britain and Australia, voters replaced Labor governments with conservatives and the economy improved. In Sweden, voters replaced Conservatives with Liberals, then with Social Democrats, and the economy improved. In the Canadian agricultural province of Saskatchewan, voters replaced Conservatives with Socialists and the economy improved. In the adjacent agricultural province of Alberta, voters replaced a socialist party with a right-leaning funny-money party created from scratch by a charismatic radio preacher, and the economy improved. In Weimar Germany, where economic distress was deeper and longer-lasting, voters rejected all of the mainstream parties, the Nazis seized power, and the economy improved. In every case, the party that happened to be in power when the Depression eased dominated politics for a decade or more thereafter. It seems farfetched to imagine that all these contradictory shifts represented well-considered ideological conversions. A more parsimonious interpretation is that voters simply-and simple-mindedly-rewarded whoever happened to be in power when things got better.
Presidential vote and House seats, by state
More "swooning" over Sarah...
What I don’t like is the effect I think Palin will ultimately have on the ticket. With all her charm, she is still a pick aimed squarely at the Republican base. In a high turnout Presidential year, I am not worried about turning out the base. I’m worried about everybody else we need to win and I fear that among those voters, Sarah Palin will be a dud.
I know, I know, she’s a “hockey mom” and through the magic of identity politics she is going to make female voters swarm across party lines in numbers that Gerry Ferraro never dreamed of since this identity politics hokum is only a good idea that is certain to work when, um, we Republicans try to do it.
The idiocy of the Palin pick
More hereUntil now, one could counter the Democrats' argument that a McCain presidency would amount to a third term for Bush. After all, McCain is a deficit hawk. He cares about the environment. Many pro-choice voters were willing to overlook McCain's generally anti-abortion stance on the belief that he didn't really care about the issue. And the widespread concern regarding McCain's age could have been assuaged by the choice of a competent vice president.
Then who does McCain pick for VP? A 44-year-old who parades her dysfunctional family as a poster-child for conservative values. Who has virtually no foreign policy experience. Who as mayor of an Alaskan town of 6,700 hired lobbyists to reel in $27 million in federal pork. That's $4,030 of the U.S. taxpayers' money per resident. We thought McCain wanted to close down the trough.
Predicting the popular vote, part I
Popular vote | ||||
Model | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
July popularity | 0.189** | 0.322** | 0.315** | 0.269** |
-3.59 | -5.09 | -4.56 | -5.08 | |
GNP change | 1.523** | |||
-3.22 | ||||
In-party Terms | -4.151** | |||
-3.28 | ||||
Leading indicators | 0.11 | |||
-0.34 | ||||
GDP growth | 0.293 | |||
-1.81 | ||||
Incumbent dummy | 3.832* | |||
-2.79 | ||||
Constant | 42.569** | 36.899** | 37.122** | 36.167** |
-16.17 | -11.63 | -11.09 | -14.33 | |
Observations | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
R-squared | 0.87 | 0.67 | 0.67 | 0.83 |
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses | ||||
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% | ||||