As long as he's at about 45% or above he should be OK.
How low can Obama's approval rating get and he still win re-election?
As long as he's at about 45% or above he should be OK.
100 day job grades
In a poll conducted from April 23-26, 2009 by the Opinion Research Corporation (on behalf of CNN), respondents were asked a series of questions, many of which focused on grading the performance of President Obama and the 111th Congress, 100 days in. Unsurprisingly, there was a strong relationship between how a respondent graded Obama and how they graded the Democratic congressional delegation. Oddly, a not very strong relationship existed between how Obama and the Republican delegation were graded:
(for details on how this plot was created, see here.)
Gender and non-partisanship
Women are far more likely to be partisans than men. This surprises me, and I can't come up with a good, theoretically sound reason for it. It is well established that women lean disproportionally towards the Democratic Party and men towards the Republican Party, but it also seems as if women lean towards partisanship in general, at least when compared to men. Think of it this way - women are just as likely to be Republicans as men are, but they are far more likely to be Democrats than men. And this pattern is consistent regardless of age or income.
Figure 1. Probability of non-partisanship among men and women, by age group, 2006.
Figure 2. Probability of non-partisanship among men and women, by age group, 2006.
Gallup partisanship trends, 2004-present
Gallup regularly asks poll respondents their party identification. The graph above shows the trend in party id since, roughly, the beginning of 2004. There is a general trend away from the Republican party, but not necessarily to the Democrats. It's also interesting to note that the anti-GOP trend has stopped, and possibly reversed, since the November 2008 election.
The pale dots reflect specific poll results, the wiggly solid lines represent LOWESS-smoothed trends, and the dotted lines represent linear trend estimates based on bivariate OLS regression.
The pale dots reflect specific poll results, the wiggly solid lines represent LOWESS-smoothed trends, and the dotted lines represent linear trend estimates based on bivariate OLS regression.
Who votes for green parties?
The educated middle-class left, it appears, at least in the European context. In looking at predilection towards voting for green parties rather than social democratic parties as part of a larger research project, I ran some quick and dirty logistic regressions, using data from the first (2002) wave of the European Social Survey. I'm looking at Europe (or at least the countries represented in the survey) as a whole, and also some individual countries. For the present time I am restricting my analysis to those respondents I have coded as "soft left", i.e., those who responded with a "3" or "4" on an 11-point (0-10) left-right scale. It is these voters whom I consider to be the most fertile "hunting ground", in a Downsian party space, for both social democratic and green parties. Table 1, below, shows that the 'typical' green or social democratic voter is just slightly left of a four on the 0-10 self-placement scale.
Table 1. Summary data for placement on a left-right scale of green and social democratic voters.
Next I will look at some proxies for middle-class status and their relationship with a predilection for voting either green or social democratic. Since my hypothesis is not only that persons who are currently middle class are, ideology being held constant, more likely to vote green than social democratic, but also (and this is actually the important past), those who have middle-class backgrounds, i.e., their parents were middle class as well, form the base of ecological party support. Therefore, two proxies for continued middle-class status are introduced, father’s level of education and father’s employment status – professional, middle class, working class.
1. Level of education
First, looking at the respondent's (voter's) level of education, there is in several countries in the survey a marked relationship in the likelihood to support either a green or social democratic party, based on level of education. This relationship is particularly evident in the case of Austria:
Figure 1. The relationship between education and the probability of voting either green (Grüne) or social democratic (SPÖ) in Austria.
The above graph shows Austria to be an almost perfect illustration of the effect of education on voting behavior among "soft left" respondents. the probability lines are almost symmetrical in their negative relationship - the less educated you are, the more likely you will vote for the SPÖ; the better educated, the greater likelihood you will vote Grüne, with the point at which the likelihood is the same being at roughly 15 years of education.
Figure 2. The relationship between education and the probability of voting either green (Vihreä liitto) or social democratic (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue) in Finland.
Here we see a situation similar to the one in Austria, where "soft-left" voters likelihood to vote green can be seen as a function of education more than anything else, especially as we see education level as a proxy for social class (probably something we can get away with more readily in Europe than in the United States.)
Figure 3. The relationship between education and the probability of voting either green (Grüne) or social democratic (SPÖ) in Sweden.
Table 1. Summary data for placement on a left-right scale of green and social democratic voters.
Next I will look at some proxies for middle-class status and their relationship with a predilection for voting either green or social democratic. Since my hypothesis is not only that persons who are currently middle class are, ideology being held constant, more likely to vote green than social democratic, but also (and this is actually the important past), those who have middle-class backgrounds, i.e., their parents were middle class as well, form the base of ecological party support. Therefore, two proxies for continued middle-class status are introduced, father’s level of education and father’s employment status – professional, middle class, working class.
1. Level of education
First, looking at the respondent's (voter's) level of education, there is in several countries in the survey a marked relationship in the likelihood to support either a green or social democratic party, based on level of education. This relationship is particularly evident in the case of Austria:
Figure 1. The relationship between education and the probability of voting either green (Grüne) or social democratic (SPÖ) in Austria.
The above graph shows Austria to be an almost perfect illustration of the effect of education on voting behavior among "soft left" respondents. the probability lines are almost symmetrical in their negative relationship - the less educated you are, the more likely you will vote for the SPÖ; the better educated, the greater likelihood you will vote Grüne, with the point at which the likelihood is the same being at roughly 15 years of education.
Figure 2. The relationship between education and the probability of voting either green (Vihreä liitto) or social democratic (Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue) in Finland.
Here we see a situation similar to the one in Austria, where "soft-left" voters likelihood to vote green can be seen as a function of education more than anything else, especially as we see education level as a proxy for social class (probably something we can get away with more readily in Europe than in the United States.)
Figure 3. The relationship between education and the probability of voting either green (Grüne) or social democratic (SPÖ) in Sweden.
'Spreading the wealth'
How do Americans really feel about 'spreading the wealth', as Senator Obama so bluntly phrased it last week? Characteristically, Americans are pretty middle-of-the-road when it comes to government redistribution of wealth - we think a little is fine, but not too much, thank you very much. And, also not surprising, your party affiliation says a lot about how you feel about redistributive policies, with Democrats being the most open to it, Republicans the most hostile, and Independents somewhere in the middle.
The graph below shows the average response to the General Social Surveys question, "SHOULD GOVT REDUCE INCOME DIFFERENCES?"
The graph below shows the average response to the General Social Surveys question, "SHOULD GOVT REDUCE INCOME DIFFERENCES?"
It's interesting to note that each group is roughly in the same place now as it was 20 years ago; with minor fluctuations along the way. Another thing to note is a sharp shift toward the right (or up, in looking at this graph) in the early '90s, coinciding with the major shift in Congressional alignment in the 1994 midterms.
Are these attitudes dependent on external conditions, like high unemployment? In most cases, no. In particular, neither Democrats nor Republicans seem swayed in their beliefs by external conditions. In one case, however, there is evidence of economic conditions affecting attitudes towards redistributive policies. Independents, it seems, respond to economic growth through increased opposition (or decreased support, if you will) for redistributive policies.
Are these attitudes dependent on external conditions, like high unemployment? In most cases, no. In particular, neither Democrats nor Republicans seem swayed in their beliefs by external conditions. In one case, however, there is evidence of economic conditions affecting attitudes towards redistributive policies. Independents, it seems, respond to economic growth through increased opposition (or decreased support, if you will) for redistributive policies.
So, true to their nature, independents are either truly independent of rigid ideology, or merely blow with the wind, depending on your view of partisanship.
Maybe parties don't matter?
Larry Bartels writes:
Considering America’s Depression-era politics in comparative perspective reinforces the impression that there may have been a good deal less real policy content to “throwing the bums out” than meets the eye. In the U.S., voters replaced Republicans with Democrats and the economy improved. In Britain and Australia, voters replaced Labor governments with conservatives and the economy improved. In Sweden, voters replaced Conservatives with Liberals, then with Social Democrats, and the economy improved. In the Canadian agricultural province of Saskatchewan, voters replaced Conservatives with Socialists and the economy improved. In the adjacent agricultural province of Alberta, voters replaced a socialist party with a right-leaning funny-money party created from scratch by a charismatic radio preacher, and the economy improved. In Weimar Germany, where economic distress was deeper and longer-lasting, voters rejected all of the mainstream parties, the Nazis seized power, and the economy improved. In every case, the party that happened to be in power when the Depression eased dominated politics for a decade or more thereafter. It seems farfetched to imagine that all these contradictory shifts represented well-considered ideological conversions. A more parsimonious interpretation is that voters simply-and simple-mindedly-rewarded whoever happened to be in power when things got better.
Presidential vote and House seats, by state
Something I did for my own curiosity.
The relationship between Republican presidential vote and the % of a state's House delegation being Republican:
The relationship between Republican presidential vote and the % of a state's House delegation being Republican:
More "swooning" over Sarah...
Mike Murphy, writing for Time's website, doesn't like her either:
What I don’t like is the effect I think Palin will ultimately have on the ticket. With all her charm, she is still a pick aimed squarely at the Republican base. In a high turnout Presidential year, I am not worried about turning out the base. I’m worried about everybody else we need to win and I fear that among those voters, Sarah Palin will be a dud.
I know, I know, she’s a “hockey mom” and through the magic of identity politics she is going to make female voters swarm across party lines in numbers that Gerry Ferraro never dreamed of since this identity politics hokum is only a good idea that is certain to work when, um, we Republicans try to do it.
The idiocy of the Palin pick
Froma Harron on how Sarah Palin is a big turnoff for independents:
More hereUntil now, one could counter the Democrats' argument that a McCain presidency would amount to a third term for Bush. After all, McCain is a deficit hawk. He cares about the environment. Many pro-choice voters were willing to overlook McCain's generally anti-abortion stance on the belief that he didn't really care about the issue. And the widespread concern regarding McCain's age could have been assuaged by the choice of a competent vice president.
Then who does McCain pick for VP? A 44-year-old who parades her dysfunctional family as a poster-child for conservative values. Who has virtually no foreign policy experience. Who as mayor of an Alaskan town of 6,700 hired lobbyists to reel in $27 million in federal pork. That's $4,030 of the U.S. taxpayers' money per resident. We thought McCain wanted to close down the trough.
Predicting the popular vote, part I
Popular vote | ||||
| Model | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| July popularity | 0.189** | 0.322** | 0.315** | 0.269** |
-3.59 | -5.09 | -4.56 | -5.08 | |
| GNP change | 1.523** | |||
-3.22 | ||||
| In-party Terms | -4.151** | |||
-3.28 | ||||
| Leading indicators | 0.11 | |||
-0.34 | ||||
| GDP growth | 0.293 | |||
-1.81 | ||||
| Incumbent dummy | 3.832* | |||
-2.79 | ||||
| Constant | 42.569** | 36.899** | 37.122** | 36.167** |
-16.17 | -11.63 | -11.09 | -14.33 | |
| Observations | 15 | 15 | 15 | 15 |
| R-squared | 0.87 | 0.67 | 0.67 | 0.83 |
| Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses | ||||
| * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% | ||||
The Economist on McCain 2.0
Mr McCain used to be a passionate believer in limited government and sound public finances; a man with some distaste for conservative Republicanism and its obsession with reproductive matters. On the stump, though, he has offered big tax cuts for business and the rich that he is unable to pay for, and he is much more polite to the religious right, whom he once called “agents of intolerance”. He has engaged in pretty naked populism, too, for instance in calling for a “gas-tax holiday”. If this is all just a gimmick to keep his party’s right wing happy, it may disappear again. But that is quite a gamble to take.
Two months remain before the election, more than enough time for Mr McCain to allay some of these worries. He needs to spend less time reassuring evangelicals that he agrees with them about abortion and gay marriage, and more time having another look at his tax plans. The old John McCain attacked Mr Bush for his tax cuts, which he said were unaffordable. The new John McCain not only wants to make the Bush tax cuts permanent, but wants to add to them by virtually eliminating estate tax (something that would benefit a tiny number of very rich families, like his own). He also proposes to slash corporation tax. People on middle incomes would see little benefit. Independent analysts agree that Mr McCain’s plans would increase an already huge deficit.
Hawkish foreign policy, irresponsible tax cuts, more talk about religion and abortion: all this sounds too much like Bush Three, the label the Democrats are trying to hang around the Republican’s neck. We preferred McCain One.
I have two words for David Brooks...
What the Palin Pick Says
...and those words are "Keating Five."
"The main axis in McCain’s worldview is not left-right. It’s public service versus narrow self-interest. Throughout his career, he has been drawn to those crusades that enabled him to launch frontal attacks on the concentrated powers of selfishness — whether it was the big money donors who exploited the loose campaign finance system, the earmark specialists in Congress like Alaska’s Don Young and Ted Stevens, the corrupt Pentagon contractors or Jack Abramoff."
...and those words are "Keating Five."
Obama and "the two Bobs"
To understand where Obama stands, you first have to know that, for 15 years, Democratic Party economics have been defined by a struggle that took place during the start of the Clinton administration. It was the battle of the Bobs. On one side was Clinton’s labor secretary and longtime friend, Bob Reich, who argued that the government should invest in roads, bridges, worker training and the like to stimulate the economy and help the middle class. On the other side was Bob Rubin, a former Goldman Sachs executive turned White House aide, who favored reducing the deficit to soothe the bond market, bring down interest rates and get the economy moving again. Clinton cast his lot with Rubin, and to this day the first question about any Democrat’s economic outlook is often where his heart lies, with Reich or Rubin, the left or the center, the government or the market.
Obama has obviously studied this debate, and early on during the flight to Chicago, he told me a story about Reich and Rubin. The previous week, Obama convened a discussion with a high-powered group of economists and chief executives. He was sitting at a conference table, with Rubin two seats to his left and Reich across from him. “One of the points I raised,” Obama told me, “is if you just use you, Bob, and you, Bob, as caricatures, the truth is, both of you acknowledge the world is more complicated.” By this, Obama didn’t simply mean that their views were more nuanced than many outsiders understood. He meant that both have come to acknowledge that the other man is, in part, correct. The two now occupy more similar ideological places than they did in 1993. The battle of the Bobs may not be completely over, but it has certainly been suspended.
Race and Obama
Sean Wilentz:
From a roundtable at Salon.com
Race has primarily played a factor to help Barack Obama. Not only with the African-American vote, which is fairly clear, I mean it's obviously clear, but with some white voters as well. I think that the idea that Hillary Clinton has suddenly gained a lot of support from racists, which we call "low information" voters, things like that, is just a myth. I mean, in fact, if you look over the exit polls, she's done much better in the votes since March, in fact, most of that support can be accounted for over the last three months, for greater support among upper and middle income white voters. It's not [these] mythic Appalachian, racist whites. That's a very small percentage of her pickup over Obama over the past three months. So I just don't buy it. I think certainly there's an element of that there, but I think that it's very, very small.